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Abstract
We test for asymmetric information in the UK private health in-
surance (PHI) market. In contrast to earlier research that consid-
ers either a purely private system or one where private insurance is
complementary to public insurance, PHI is substitutive of the public
system in the UK. Using a theoretical model of competition among
insurers incorporating this characteristic, we link the type of selection
(adverse or propitious) with the existence of risk-related information
asymmetries. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we nd evi-
dence that adverse selection is present in the PHI market, which leads
us to conclude that such information asymmetries exist.
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1 Introduction
The extent to which individuals have privileged information on their own
risks (ex-ante asymmetric information) is important because it is one of
the main justications for public intervention in insurance markets (Dahlby,
1981). Indeed, individuals who know that their risk of falling ill is low will
have a low willingness to pay for health insurance. This might lead to the
well-known problem of adverse selection, which results in lower risk individ-
uals enjoying less than full insurance.
The main aim of this work is to test for asymmetric information in the
UKs private health insurance (PHI) market. Unlike previous literature, we
focus on a market that coexists with a free public and universal outside op-
tion, namely, the National Health Service (NHS). Indeed, everyone is publicly
insured under the NHS, which is funded through taxation. So individuals
contribute to the nancing of public care, whether they use it or not (Prop-
per, 1989,1993; Besley and Coate, 1991; OECD, 2004). The presence of a
free public outside option, the NHS, means that we cannot directly apply
the results of the standard Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (RS henceforth)
model to build our test. The reason is that no such outside option exists
in their analysis. Hence, our theoretical analysis contributes to the existing
literature by incorporating a public insurer as an outside option within a RS
framework.1
Our strategy to test for asymmetric information is built in two steps. In
the rst step, using a theoretical model, we show that if information is sym-
1This is a contribution of our work because the competitive equilibrium that arises
within such a framework has, to our knowledge, never been studied under either symmetric
or asymmetric information. An exception is Encinosa (2003), but he concentrates on the
case in which the PHI market o¤ers a single (and therefore pooling) contract. On the other
hand, he extends the analysis to heterogenous income. Previous literature has focused
either on a framework in which the PHI covers whatever copayments are not covered by
a basic public insurance contract, or on one in which the public insurance is altogether
absent. More on this below.
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metric (asymmetric) then propitious (adverse) selection should be observed.
This contrasts with the standard RS framework which predicts the absence
of any selection under symmetric information (that is, both high risk and
low risk individuals end up enjoying full insurance).
In the second step, we use the British Household Panel Survey, (Univer-
sity of Essex, 2010) to ascertain whether selection is adverse or propitious.
Our test compares the use of health care services by employees who receive
PHI as a fringe benet with that by individuals who buy it directly. Indi-
vidually bought PHI and employer PHI provide similar benets in the UK
(Propper and Maynard, 1989), a conclusion that our empirical analysis cor-
roborates. Hence, any di¤erence in the use of health care services between
the two groups is due to di¤erences in risk, and not to di¤erences in the levels
of coverage (the so-called price or moral hazard e¤ect). We nd evidence of
adverse selection. Individuals who purchase PHI have a higher probability
of both hospitalisation and visiting their general practitioner (GP) than in-
dividuals who receive PHI as a fringe benet. This leads us to conclude that
asymmetric information is present in the PHI market in the UK.
As for our testing strategy, it is subject to three di¤erent potential sources
of bias, which we investigate and are able rule out. First, di¤erences in health
care use might reect di¤erences in health between those with employer-
provided PHI and those without. Second, employers that provide PHI might
also facilitate the take-up of preventive services, which might translate into
lower use of curative health care for individuals with employer-provided PHI.
Third, these di¤erences in hospitalisation rates could also be caused by dif-
ferences in the coverage made available between employer-provided PHI and
individually purchased PHI.
The empirical literature has found mixed evidence on whether there is
any selection in insurance markets, which casts doubts on the existence of
asymmetric information and on the need for public intervention. On the one
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hand, in his survey of insurance markets, Chiappori (2000) concludes that
the importance of adverse selection is limited. Nor do Cardon and Hendel
(2001) nd evidence of adverse selection in the US employer-provided health
insurance market. Chiappori and Salanié (1997, 2000) nd no evidence of
adverse selection in the French automobile insurance market. In the life in-
surance market, neither Cawley and Philipson (1999) nor Hendel and Lizzeri
(2003) nd evidence of adverse selection. On the other hand, Ettner (1997)
and Finkelstein (2004) nd evidence of adverse selection in the Medigap mar-
ket in the US. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004, 2006) nd evidence of adverse
selection in the UK annuity market, and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) nd
evidence of risk-related adverse selection in the US long-term care insurance
market. More recently, Fang et al. (2008) nd evidence of propitious selec-
tion in the Medigap market. It is clear that more research is needed in order
to obtain a better assessment of the presence of asymmetric information in
insurance markets.
Around the world, public and private health insurance are linked in di¤er-
ent ways. In the US, a large segment of the population is ineligible for public
insurance and must resort to PHI. For this segment of the population, their
situation constitutes an example of a purely private framework. In France,
Belgium, and the US Medicare, PHI is complementary to public insurance:
an individual obtains a basic insurance contract from the insurer of his choice
(funded by the government) and can buy a complementary PHI contract to
cover whatever copayments are not covered by the basic insurance contract.
We refer to this as the complements framework.
In the UK, our testing arena, the public insurance system provides treat-
ment instead of just nancing some basic coverage. Hence, an individual
can only substitute the treatment funded by the public system by receiving
care funded through PHI. This means that the private insurer must bear the
entire treatment cost. We refer to this as the substitutes framework, which
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is not only found in the UK but also in Finland, Greece, Italy, Mexico, New
Zealand, Portugal, and Spain.2
It may seem puzzling, in systems with a publicly funded outside option,
that anyone would purchase PHI in the rst place. A possible explanation is
that private care is perceived to be of higher quality along some dimension
(Besley and Coate, 1991). For instance, PHI enrollees are able to obtain
treatment from the private sector without having to put up with long waiting
lists (Propper and Maynard, 1989; Propper, 1995; Besley et al., 1998 and
1999; Propper et al., 2001; OECD, 2004). Another possible reason is that
health care obtained through PHI o¤ers better hotel services.
Our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present our model of
a substitutes framework and provide our equilibrium notion. In Section 3
we solve the model both under symmetric information (subsection 3.1) and
under asymmetric information (subsection 3.2) and perform some compar-
isons (subsection 3.3). Also in Section 3, we discuss our results when we
extend the model to consider heterogeneity in other dimensions (subsection
3.4), and we compare the predictions of the substitutes and the comple-
ments framework (subsection 3.5). In Section 4 we perform the empirical
analysis. We rst describe the institutional setting (subsection 4.1) and the
data (subsection 4.2), then explain the test in detail (subsection 4.3) and
report our main results (subsection 4.4). We then investigate the source of
asymmetric information (subsection 4.5). We nish section 4 by discussing
three potential threats to the validity of our results and showing why they
are not relevant in our setting (subsection 4.6). We conclude the paper in
Section 5. Some technical details are relegated to Appendix A. The proofs
of all lemmata and propositions are contained in Appendix B. Some tables
2See OECD (2004) for a proposal of taxonomy of health insurance with country ex-
amples. The authors use the term duplicate to refer to what we call the substitutes
system.
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are relegated to Appendix C.
2 A Model of a Substitutes Framework
A substitutive PHI is characterised by the following two features. First,
if an individual with PHI seeks care, he must choose between the private
treatment covered by his insurance (the private option) and the publicly
funded treatment (the public option). That is, privately and publicly funded
services cannot be combined (e.g., he cannot have an operation in the public
option and then receive its post-operative treatment in the private option).
Second, when an individual with PHI chooses the private option, the private
insurer must bear the full cost of treatment. Our theoretical model considers
these two distinguishing features of the substitutes framework.
Insurers use some observables to classify individuals and tailor their con-
tract o¤er to each specic class. Within a class, all individuals face the
same loss `0 upon perceiving the need of seeking care and enjoy the same
net (post-tax) income w:3 All heterogeneity among individuals within a class
comes from their innate probability of seeking health care (see subsection 3.4
for a discussion on the consequences of having also risk aversion or loss size
heterogeneity). By innate we mean that di¤erences in this probability across
individuals can either relate to di¤erences in health status or di¤erences in
the individualspreferences for health care, but they do not incorporate the
e¤ects of di¤erences in access conditions. As mentioned in the introduction,
our empirical analysis sheds some light on the true source of heterogeneity.
We assume that there are high risk and low risk individuals. Let pH (re-
spectively, pL) be the innate probability of seeking care of the high risk (low
risk) individuals, 0 < pL < pH < 1. Under symmetric information, the indi-
3In this paper, we do not model the tax system explicitly. A model with taxes is
available upon request from the authors. The main results are robust to the introduction
of taxes.
6
viduals innate probability of seeking care is publicly observable, while it is
only observed by him under asymmetric information. We analyse both cases.
It is common knowledge that the proportion of low risks in the economy is
0 <  < 1. We denote by p = pL+(1 )pH the average innate probability
of seeking care in the population.
If an individual has chosen to purchase PHI from a specic insurer, he
enjoys double coverage. If this individual seeks care, he chooses either the
public or the private option. Each of these two options may imply di¤erent
copayments, waiting times, qualities, ancillary services, or guidelines. We
will measure all of these characteristics, as well as the initial health status,
in monetary units, as is standard in models of insurance under asymmetric
information. Let a be the nal disposable income in the case of seeking care
and let n be that in the case of not seeking health care. An individual of
type J = L;H enjoys ex-ante expected utility given by
UJ (n; a) = pJu (a) + (1  pJ)u (n) :
If an individual obtains treatment from the public option (either because
he has not purchased PHI or because he prefers the public treatment), his loss
is reduced from `0 to `PUB. Suppose that he is of type J . If he has decided not
to purchase PHI, he enjoys expected utility UJ(w;w  `PUB). PHI contracts
are available in the market and can be described by a two-dimensional vector
(`; q), where ` denotes the insurers commitment to reduce the insurees nal
losses from `0 to ` if he seeks privately funded treatment and q denotes the
insurance premium. Therefore, if the individual of type J does purchase
some private contract (`; q), his expected utility is UJ (w   q; w   `  q).4
4An implicit assumption is that an agent does not receive a tax rebate if he chooses
to purchase private insurance. Otherwise, the government would return part of the taxes
paid by this consumer and w would have to be revised accordingly. In the UK (our testing
arena), a rebate was in place for individuals over the age of 60 but it was discontinued in
July 1997.
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An insurer o¤ering contract (`; q) bears the cost of reducing losses from `0
to `. Expected prots are therefore given by q   pJ(`0   `).
After conducting the standard change of variable (see Appendix A.1 for
details), in Figure 1 we depict indi¤erence curves, zero isoprots, and con-
tracts in the space of nal wealths. It is important to notice that, whereas
the zero isoprot lines go through the point of no insurance (neither public
nor private), denoted by A, the nal wealth vector associated with the public
option (denoted by P ) is any point in the vertical line through n = w. Alloca-
tive e¢ ciency is reached at contracts on the 45-degree line, where isoprots
and indi¤erence curves are tangent. If on top of e¢ ciency we impose zero
prots per type, we obtain the contracts labelled L and 

H in the gure.
These contracts will become useful later on.
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
The presence of the public option P at the outset (i.e. constituting a
committed o¤er) may imply that some contracts that were attracting indi-
viduals in the equilibrium in the absence of P may now become inviable, and
vice versa. Hence the following terminology.
Denition 1 If a contract  attracts some individuals, we say that the con-
tract is active. Analogously, if the public option P attracts some individuals,
we say that the public sector is active.
A su¢ cient condition for a contract to be active in equilibrium is that
it o¤ers strictly more utility to some risk type than both the rest of the
contracts o¤ered and the public option. The same goes for the public option.
However, this condition is not necessary. If some type is indi¤erent between
two o¤ers, both o¤ers may attract individuals of this type. The simplest way
to close the model is to assume the following tie-breaking rule.
Assumption 1 If all individuals of type J are indi¤erent between the public
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option P and the best private contract for them, all individuals of type J
choose the public option.
Our equilibrium notion is the following.
Denition 2 An equilibrium set of active contracts S (ESAC henceforth)
is a set of contracts (that may or may not include the public option P ) such
that
(i) each and every contract in S is o¤ered either by some insurer(s) or by
the public sector and is active; and
(ii) if a single insurer deviates by o¤ering a contract outside this set, either
this contract will be inactive or this insurer will not make additional prots.
3 Solving the Model for each Informational
Scenario
We rst solve the game under the hypothesis of symmetric information. We
then proceed to the case where the innate probability of seeking care is an
individuals private information. After comparing the equilibria in the two
settings, we move to some extensions. Finally, we look at di¤erences between
the substitutes and the complements frameworks.
3.1 The Equilibrium under Symmetric Information
Consider rst the situation in which there is no public health option. The
low and high risk PHI markets are segmented. Following RS, the equilibrium
entails e¢ cient contracts (full insurance) and zero prot per individual, no
matter his type. This yields contracts fH ; Lg depicted in Figure 1 (see
Appendix A.2 for details).
We now nd the ESAC for each possible P (that is, for each possible value
of `PUB). We illustrate our arguments by means of Figure 1. Point H0 is the
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public option such that a high risk is indi¤erent between H and H0. Point
L0 is the public option such that a low risk is indi¤erent between L and L0.
The following lemma cannot be proven graphically and is a consequence of
Jensens inequality.5
Lemma 1 If individuals only di¤er in their innate probability of seeking
care, point H0 lies below point L0.
This result is the cornerstone of our empirical test. Before providing
the intuition, let us point out that the limited heterogeneity assumption is
su¢ cient but not necessary, as will be shown in subsection 3.4, where we
discuss the possibility that individuals also di¤er in their attitude toward
risk as well as in the size of their loss.
The intuition for Lemma 1 is the following. In the competitive equilibrium
under symmetric information, each type opting for PHI pays an actuarially
fair contract covering his losses in full in the case of seeking care. Therefore,
the premium paid by a high risk is higher than that of the low risk, while the
coverage is the same. At the point of deciding whether to purchase PHI or
not, an individual is confronted with the possibility of a free outside option
(the public sector services) that only o¤ers partial coverage (perhaps due
to long waiting, low-quality amenities, and so on). Graphically, the public
option is far from the 45-degree line. Since the high risks pay a higher
premium for PHI, they would be indi¤erent between PHI and the public
sector even if the coverage in the public sector were relatively low. Hence
the point H0 is relatively low. Consider now the low risks. They pay a low
premium. If they are as risk averse as the high risks and if they face the same
loss as the high risks, then the coverage in the public sector needed to make
them indi¤erent between sectors has to be high. Hence point L0 is high.
5We are indebted to Juan Enrique Martínez-Legaz for providing the elegant proof that
can be found in Appendix B.
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Notice, however, that if the low risks where su¢ ciently less risk averse
than the high risks, then the public sector coverage that would make them
indi¤erent between sectors would be so small that point L0 might lie below
H0. We discuss this possibility in subsection 3.4.2. A similar conclusion
would be reached if the loss faced by a low risk were su¢ ciently smaller than
a high risksloss. We discuss this other possibility in subsection 3.4.3.
Once the positions of H0 and L0 are known, we can analyse the situation
case by case, i.e., for each possible position of the public option.
Proposition 1 Suppose that information is symmetric. Then, under As-
sumption 1, a unique ESAC exists for each and every position of the public
option P , and it is characterised as follows.
(a) If P lies strictly below point H0, the ESAC is fL; Hg, high risks pick
H and low risks pick 

L; the public sector is inactive.
(b) If P lies on or above point H0 but strictly below point L0, the ESAC is
fL; Pg, low risks pick L and high risks pick P ; both sectors are active.
(c) If P lies on or above L0, the ESAC is fPg and only the public sector is
active.
Notice that both sectors are active only if (b) holds, and in this case only
the low risks resort to the private sector. This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the two sectors are active and information is sym-
metric. Under Assumption 1, the innate probability of seeking care among
the privately insured is pL, which is smaller than p, the average in the general
population.
The reason we compare the innate probability of seeking care of those who
purchase insurance with the average probability in the general population will
be explained in Section 4, since it is relevant for our empirical test.
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The intuition for this result is the following. Under symmetric informa-
tion, the only possible way to survive competition is to o¤er full insurance.
Since all individuals face the same loss irrespective of their risk,6 this means
that the premium should be larger for the high risk market than for the low
risk market. If public health insurance is available and is nanced with com-
pulsory general taxation, it will be more attractive to a high risk because he
would have to pay a larger premium to private insurers.
Finally, notice that we are not saying that the only possible prediction of
our model under symmetric information is that adverse selection into PHI
will be observed. Our claim is that, if information is symmetric and both
options are active then propitious selection should be observed.
3.2 The Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information
As in the previous subsection, consider rst the situation where there is no
public health system. We know from RS that the competitive equilibrium,
if it exists, entails an e¢ cient contract (full insurance) for the high risks
and zero prots for an insurer attracting a high risk. Therefore, the high
risk contract under asymmetric information is the same as under symmetric
information, H . The low risk contract must satisfy the high risk incentive
compatibility constraint with equality and also yield zero prots. These two
equations yield the contract depicted by ^L in Figure 2 (the roman numerals
can be ignored as they are just used in the proofs).7
[FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]
In Figure 2, point H0 is again the public contract such that a high risk
is indi¤erent between H and H0. Notice that point H0 is the same whether
6We will discuss the consequences of relaxing this assumption in subsection 3.4.3.
7As is well known, the set of contracts f^L; Hg constitutes only a candidate, albeit
unique, for a competitive equilibrium. In the purely private competitive model there exists
a critical proportion of low risks such that an equilibrium exists if and only if this critical
value is not exceeded. This is our working assumption here on.
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information is present or not, since the equilibrium contract for the high risk
is the same. Point L1 is the public contract such that a low risk is indi¤erent
between ^L and L1. The relative position of H0 and L1 is given in the next
lemma.
Lemma 2 If individuals only di¤er in their innate probability of seeking
care, H0 lies above L1.
Intuitively, asymmetric information forces the market to o¤er such a low
coverage to the low risk, that the coverage needed in the public option to
induce indi¤erence between sectors is also very small.
The next proposition characterizes the ESAC for each possible position
of P in Figure 2.
Proposition 2 Suppose that information is asymmetric. Then, under As-
sumption 1, a unique ESAC exists for each and every position of the public
option P , and is characterised as follows.
(a) If P lies strictly below point L1, the ESAC is f^L; Hg; high risks pick
H and low risks pick ^L; the public sector is inactive.
(b) If P lies on or above point L1 but strictly below point H0, the ESAC is
fH ; Pg; low risks pick P and high risks pick H ; both sectors are active.
(c) If P lies on or above point H0, the ESAC is fPg and only the public
sector is active.
Notice that both sectors are active only in case (b), where the high risks
pick the private sector. We have the following and most important corollary.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the two sectors are active and information is
asymmetric. Then, under Assumption 1, the innate probability of seeking
care for those who decide to purchase private insurance is pH , which is larger
than p, the average in the general population.
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The intuition for this result is the following. Regarding why the private
option can only be in equilibrium if it o¤ers full insurance to the high risks,
the same intuition of the RS model applies, namely, that competitive forces
will rule out any ine¢ ciencies or positive prots in the contract of the type
that has most incentives to lie. Let us suppose now that the private option
supports a contract aimed at attracting the low risks. Again due to competi-
tive forces, such a contract could not yield positive prots. More importantly,
it would have to provide (much) less than full insurance at a cheap premium,
in order to avoid high risks disguising themselves as low risks. Notice that
this implies that the private option would do a very poor job in terms of in-
surance. If the public option is to be active, as assumed, it must be because
it attracts these low risks. Let us stress that our claim is conditional on both
sectors being active.
3.3 Comparisons
Corollaries 1 and 2 tell us that the sign of the di¤erence between p and the
innate probability of seeking care of the privately insured crucially depends
on whether information is symmetric or asymmetric. Basically, symmetric
information leads to propitious selection, while asymmetric information leads
to adverse selection. This is the main contribution of our theoretical model,
as it leads us to conclude that any evidence on adverse selection is also
indirect evidence of asymmetric information. Hence the relevance of the test
performed in the next section.
3.4 Extensions
Let us discuss under which conditions our main theoretical result extends
to some alternative scenarios. In particular, we address the possibility that
relevant information on individuals has more than one dimension, an issue
that has received a great deal of attention lately. Indeed, it is plausible that
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individuals di¤er not only in their underlying innate probability of seeking
care but also in other attributes such as their intrinsic costs of waiting (rel-
evant when waiting time is higher in the public system than in the private
system), their attitude towards risk, or the severity of their illness in the case
of falling ill.
3.4.1 Heterogeneous waiting costs
As explained in the introduction, one of the motivations for purchasing PHI
in the UK is to circumvent long waiting lists in the NHS (no, or very short,
waiting exists in the PHI sector). Hence, individuals with larger waiting costs
(possibly individuals with higher wages) will be more inclined to buy PHI. It
is fair to ask whether our one-to-one relationship between the informational
assumption and the sign of selection (adverse or propitious) extends to a
model where individuals also di¤er in the costs of being treated in the NHS.
More specically, we address the situation where the loss in the public option
(`PUB) is in part determined by waiting time. It is natural to assume that
high-wage individualsforgone income while waiting for treatment could be
larger than that of low-wage individuals. It is then clear that if insurers
cannot condition their contracts on income, the high-wage individuals will
purchase PHI, which would go in the direction of propitious selection because
high-wage individuals are usually healthier. If this e¤ect is strong enough, it
could be the case that one observes propitious selection even in the presence
of asymmetric information on medical risk.
More harmful to our (indirect) test for asymmetric information would
be the possibility that the sign of our results is reversed under symmetric
information. However, notice that waiting cost heterogeneity, according to
the previous argument, can only decrease adverse selection. Hence, if any-
thing, observing adverse selection could only be underestimating the extent
of asymmetric information.
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3.4.2 Heterogeneous risk preferences
Suppose that individuals di¤er in risk preferences as well as in risk.8 In
consequence, indi¤erence curves di¤er (at any xed contract) not only in their
slope (low risks have steeper indi¤erence curves) but also in their curvature
(more risk averse individuals have more curved indi¤erence curves). In Figure
3 we depict the worst scenario for the validity of our test, that is, one in which
symmetric information might also lead to adverse selection, as we would
then be interpreting evidence of adverse selection as a sign of asymmetric
information when in fact information is symmetric. In the gure we represent
two types of individual. Type HH individuals have a high innate probability
of seeking care and are very risk averse. Type LL individuals have a low
innate probability and are more risk tolerant. Notice that this reects the
caveat expressed after Lemma 1. Under symmetric information, both types
should receive full insurance and actuarially fair contracts: contracts L and
H in the gure, where subindices refer to risk only, not to risk preference.
Given these contracts, HH individuals facing a public outside option in the
vertical line through A and between HH0 and LL0 in the gure will prefer
the private system, while LL individuals facing this same public option will
prefer the public to the private system. Thus adverse selection is observed if
one restricts attention to HH and LL individuals.
[FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE]
However, notice two things. First of all, for the HH and the LL indif-
ference curves to cross to the left of the vertical line through A, as depicted,
one needs that the LL type has a su¢ ciently lower risk aversion than the
8A similar analysis applies when individuals di¤er in their initial wealth, as their risk
aversion is a¤ected by initial wealth. However, it is well known (see, for instance, Rees and
Wambach, 2008, Chapter 2.3) that under (empirically plausible) decreasing absolute risk
aversion, richer individuals will, everything else equal, show a lower willingness to pay for
insurance, which seems to run against evidence. A possible explanation for this apparent
paradox is explored in the previous subsection.
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HH type. We formalise this point next, a generalisation of Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 Suppose that type LL values nal wealth according to utility func-
tion uL and that type HH does so according to utility function uH . Suppose
further that juH (z)  uL (z)j is su¢ ciently close to zero for all z. Then
point HH0 lies below point LL0.
Second, types LH and HL also exist. For these types, the conclusions
reached in the main analysis are reinforced. Indeed, under symmetric infor-
mation, HL individuals have an additional reason to stay out of the private
system: not only is their premium high, but also they have a low willingness
to pay for insurance. Type LH individuals, on the other hand, will purchase
PHI not only because their premium is low but also because they are very
risk averse. This discussion points to propitious selection into the PHI sector.
To sum up, in order to have adverse selection into PHI under symmetric
information, three conditions have to hold simultaneously: (i) di¤erences in
risk aversion among individuals are large enough; (ii) the public option o¤ers
a coverage consistent with placing P exactly inside the interval given by
HH0 and LL0 in Figure 3, which is narrower than the interval that ensures
that both sectors are active;9 and (iii) the correlation between risk and risk
aversion is non-negative, i.e., individuals with a high innate probability of
seeking care should also have an underlying dislike of risk. As for (iii), Cutler
et al. (2008) nd that for Medigap and for acute health insurance there is
no systematic relationship between expected claims and behaviour measures
9In our base model, that P lies in the interval ensuring that both sectors are active,
necessarily implies that Lemma 1 applies. Here, instead, even if both sectors are active
this does not imply that P lies between points LL0 and HH0. Indeed, it could be the
case that P lies between HL0 and LL0, in which case all low risks, regardless of their risk
preference, would purchase PHI (and also the high risks that have high risk aversion), while
the relatively risk-tolerant high risks would resort to the public option. Hence propitious
selection into PHI would be observed.
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that reects risk attitudes.10 Finally, if uptake of preventive behaviour is
positively correlated with risk aversion and preventive behaviour reduces the
innate probability of seeking health care, then our results are reinforced.
What are the consequences of introducing risk preference heterogeneity
when information is asymmetric? Here we enter much less trodden terrain:
the equilibrium in a competitive market with multidimensional private infor-
mation. Very few authors have addressed this situation even in the absence
of the public option.11 Smart (2000) shows that coverage always goes in the
same direction as risk, so that the viability of a private contract aimed at
low risks in the presence of a free outside option is always more problematic
than the viability of a private contract aimed at high risks. This suggests
that the presence of a free outside option would have a similar e¤ect to that
in our model.
3.4.3 Heterogeneous severity of illness
A model in which individuals are heterogeneous in the severity of illness (as
well as in the probability of seeking care) is much further away from our base
model. First, one would expect the public sector to step in and prioritise the
most severe cases, so public coverage would become type-dependent. Second,
the issue of whether private coverage could also be contingent on the size of
loss becomes important, and results will depend on the degree of exibility
that private insurers have in tailoring coverage as a function of loss.12
10Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) nd that risk aversion and risk are positively corre-
lated, but this is specically for the long-term care insurance market rather than for the
health insurance market which is considered in Cutler et al. (2008).
11See Wambach (2000), Villeneuve (2003), and Smart (2000). In addition, these authors
assume that each insurer is restricted to o¤er a single contract. The consequences of
allowing rms to o¤er menus of contracts remains an open question.
12See Selden (1993, 1997) and Blomqvist and Johansson (1997a, 1997b), who study a
model where individuals di¤er in the severity of their illness once ill. However, there is
no heterogeneity at the time of purchasing insurance in their models, since (i) individuals
choose the amount of insurance before they learn the severity of their illness, and (ii) the
probability distribution over severity is the same for all individuals. On the other hand,
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Let us nevertheless point to some graphical intuitions for the simple case
where: (i) information is symmetric; (ii) no prioritisation exists in the public
sector; and (iii) the PHI provides full insurance (coverage equals loss), which
is natural in the context of symmetric information. In the same spirit as in
the previous subsection, we analyse the worst-case scenario for the validity
of our test, namely, a scenario where adverse selection is observed despite
information being symmetric.
Unfortunately, the graphical analysis performed in the nal wealths space
becomes more complex than in previous sections. The reason is that there
ceases to be a one-to-one relationship between each point in the nal wealths
space and each specic (premium, coverage) contract. In order to use the
space of nancial wealth in the case of heterogeneous losses, one must perform
the same change of variable as in Section 2 (see Appendix A.1 for details).
Let subindex JK denote an individual with probability pJ = pH ; pL of falling
ill and severity given by loss `K = `H ; `L. The zero isoprot line associated
with attracting a type JK = HH;HL;LH;LL can be expressed as
a =
w
pJ
  `K   n1  pJ
pJ
.
Notice that, as usual, da
dn
=  1 pJ
pJ
. More importantly, the point of no in-
surance (either public or private) is type-dependent. Indeed, if n = w, then
a = w   `K . Hence AK = (w;w   `K). Notice that the points AH and AL
correspond to the same (premium, coverage) contract, namely (P; c) = (0; 0):
The same happens to any other contract (P; c): it leads to two di¤erent points
in the wealth space, one for each severity-type. Importantly, if all types re-
ceive the same coverage cPUB in the public outside option (i.e. in the absence
their model of consumerspreferences and behaviour is richer preferences are dened on
both health and non-health goods, and consumers are allowed to contract further health
services after becoming ill. Encinosa (2003) studies a model where individuals di¤er in
their valuation of health services, which could also be interpreted as di¤erences in severity.
However, as mentioned in footnote 1, the private insurance market o¤ers a single contract.
He instead focuses on heterogeneous income, which naturally leads to the question of
a¤ordability, which we do not address.
19
of prioritisation), this public option becomes PK = (w;w `K+cPUB), which
again is type-dependent. Graphically, the vertical intercepts at n = w, de-
noted by PH and PL in Figure 4, have vertical coordinates given by
aPUBH = w   `H + cPUB
and
aPUBL = w   `L + cPUB > aPUBH ,
respectively. In Figure 4 we represent a situation where loss heterogeneity
is so important that HH individuals prefer to purchase PHI, whereas the
LL individuals prefer to take the public outside option. That is, we have
adverse selection although information is symmetric. Indeed, the point PH
is less preferred by HH to the PHI contract HH ; whereas the point P
L is
preferred to the PHI contract LL by LL.
[FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE]
Intuitively, on the one hand, a higher loss implies a higher preference for
the full-coverage PHI. On the other hand, a higher loss also implies a higher
premium (prots per capita are zero), which implies a higher preference for
the free public option. The rst e¤ect is the more intense the further away
from full insurance the public option is, since avoiding risk becomes more
important. Now, if the high risk has a higher loss than the low risk while the
two risks enjoy the same public coverage, it might be that only the high risk
prefers the private option.
However, for this to be true the di¤erence in loss between the two types
must be large enough. One can in fact use Figure 4 to see this. Suppose that
`H is su¢ ciently close to `L (in the current gure `H is much larger than `L).
Then the new position of point PH = (w;w   `H + cPUB) would lie above
the high risk indi¤erence curve through the new position of HH . Hence the
private sector would become inactive.
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Note also, types HL and LH have to be considered. The former will
choose the public option for two reasons: high premia in the PHI contract
plus a low loss. The latter will choose the private option also for two reasons:
low premia in the PHI contract and a high loss that will be fully covered there.
Hence propitious selection should be observed if one restricts attention to
these other two types.
To sum up, and in the same spirit as the previous subsection, one needs
two conditions to be simultaneously satised in order to reverse the conclu-
sions of Lemma 1. First, as argued, the di¤erences in loss among individuals
should be large enough. Second, the prevalence of types HH and LL should
be large enough relative to types HL and LH.
It is important to bear in mind that this analysis lacks realism because
we have ignored prioritisation of individuals in more severe condition in the
public sector. Introducing this factor would complicate the model consid-
erably, but our intuition is that prioritisation in public health care services
would go in our favour, since prioritising individuals with larger losses would
be similar to reducing the di¤erence between losses.
3.5 Di¤erences with the Complements Framework
As mentioned in the introduction, in some countries PHI is complementary
to public health insurance (for instance, Medigap complements Medicare in
the US). Using our notation, this means the following. The government
commits beforehand to a specic level of loss reduction, say `0  `PUB, when
the individual seeks care. If the individual has purchased PHI, upon seeking
care he enjoys a further reduction in loss, say `PUB   `, with ` < `PUB < `0.
This additional loss reduction, `PUB   `, is borne by the private insurer.
Importantly, this is unlike the substitutes framework, where the insurer bears
the full cost of reducing the loss from `0 to `.
As shown by Figure 5, this model is equivalent to the classic RS model
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except that isoprots do not stem from point A = (w;w   `0) (where the
individual enjoys neither public nor private insurance) but from point B =
(w;w   `PUB), where the individual only enjoys public insurance (see Appen-
dix A.3 for details). The competitive equilibria under symmetric information
and asymmetric information are depicted in Figure 5 by the pairs of points
(L; 

H) and (^L; 

H), respectively. Notice that both types of individuals
prefer to purchase PHI under both symmetric and asymmetric information.
Indeed, under symmetric information point B is less preferred than J by
every type J = L;H, and under asymmetric information point B is less
preferred than H by type H and less preferred than ^L by type L.
As a consequence, in order to obtain a test for asymmetric information
under complementary PHI, one needs to observe the coverage enjoyed by each
individual in his PHI contract. In this respect, the model predicts that under
symmetric information all individuals take full coverage (selection into PHI
is neither propitious nor adverse). If information is asymmetric the model
predicts that low risks will enjoy lower coverage than high risks (selection
into PHI is adverse). To sum up, one can implement an indirect test for
asymmetric information analogous to the one we perform here, but data
would have to include the level of coverage (see, for instance, Ettner, 1997).
[FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE]
4 Testing for Adverse Selection
The UK provides an ideal setting in which to apply and test our model.
First, in the UK everyone is publicly insured through the NHS. The NHS
is, in turn, nanced through general taxation. Hence, individuals contribute
to the nancing of public care whether they use it or not. Second, some
individuals buy PHI to obtain treatment from the private sector to avoid
having to put up with long waiting lists in the NHS. Health care obtained
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through PHI also o¤ers better hospital amenities (private room, en-suite
rooms, etc.). Hence, public insurance and PHI coexist in our setting.
According to our theoretical model (Corollary 1), if information is sym-
metric then propitious selection should be observed (the innate probability
of seeking medical care for the privately insured is lower than the average
in the population). Conversely, according to Corollary 2, if information is
asymmetric then adverse selection should take place (the innate probability
of seeking medical care for the privately insured is higher than the average
in the population). In sum, our theoretical model predicts that in a substi-
tutes framework, such as the UK, whether the distribution of information
is symmetric or not has a dramatic e¤ect on whether selection is adverse or
propitious. Note that we refer to the innate probability of seeking care (in-
stead of the narrower concept of probability of falling ill) because asymmetric
information could be caused by heterogeneity in preferences for medical care
(as we indicated in the theoretical model, there is also more on this below).
4.1 Institutional Setting
PHI is relatively uncommon in Britain: the percentage of individuals with
PHI has varied between 12% and 13% in the 1997-2007 period (Blackburn,
2008). The PHI market is usually divided into the individual market and the
corporate market. In the individual market, customers buy insurance directly
from the insurer or an insurance broker. In the corporate market, individuals
obtain PHI from their employer. Though in some cases the employee has
to contribute directly towards the cost of the premium, in 79% of cases the
employee receives it free, as a fringe benet. This corporate market is usually
divided into the small corporation market (50 employees or fewer) and the
large corporation market (more than 50 employees).
The regulation of the medical insurance industry is relatively soft in the
UK. Before 2005, the industry was self-regulated with voluntary subscriptions
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to the General Insurance Standard Council, Financial Ombudsman, Personal
Insurance Administration, and Association of British Insurers. Since 2005,
the industry has been regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA,
2004). The regulation emphasises clarity and transparency of the products
(Blackburn, 2008).
Insurers use age, gender, smoking status, place of residence, and occu-
pational status to set premiums (Foubister et al., 2006). Though insurers
are free to base their premiums on any set of variables, health variables are
generally not used for pricing (Mossialos and Thomson, 2004; Foubister et
al., 2006). Instead of pricing existing illnesses, insurers exclude them from
cover (exclusion of pre-existing conditions). In some insurance policies, the
individual must disclose any pre-existing conditions at the time of buying
the insurance and must grant access to his medical records to the insurer.
In other insurance policies, disclosure of pre-existing conditions happens at
the time of the claim. Any claim can be considered void if the insurer nds
that the individual did not disclose all pre-existing conditions. This could
contribute to alleviating the asymmetric information problem.
In general, PHI does not cover visits to the GP, accident and emergency
admission, long-term chronic illnesses, or preventive treatment (Association
of British Insurers, 2001). Insurers will typically not o¤er coverage to indi-
viduals older than 65 but existing policy holders are allowed to renew.
4.2 The Data
The data we use come from waves 6 to 18 of the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS) collected over the period 1996-2008.13 All adult members
13The BHPS is produced by GfK NOP, the O¢ ce for National Statistics, and the Insti-
tute for Social and Economic Research (University of Essex), sponsored by the Economic
and Social Research Council and supplied by the UK Data Archive. The Institute for So-
cial and Economic Research is the copyright holder of the data. None of these is responsible
for our analysis or interpretation of the data. See http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps
for more information.
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of each household are interviewed. Households are followed over time, even
if the original household has split up. The BHPS oversamples residents in
Scotland and Wales. We use sampling weights to make the sample repre-
sentative of the non-immigrant population of Britain (we exclude Northern
Ireland because it only enters the BHPS after the seventh wave). We only
consider waves from the sixth onwards because that is when questions about
PHI began to be included. We restrict our sample to male employees aged
23-59 (including females could lead to sample selection bias because a larger
percentage of females do not work).
In our sample of male employees aged 23-59, 5:6% buy PHI directly, 14:2%
obtain PHI from their employer as a fringe benet, 3:8% obtain PHI from
their employer but have the insurance premium deducted from their wages,
2:4% obtain PHI through a relative, and the remaining 74% do not have PHI.
4.3 Test Rationale
One would like to base the test for the type of selection (adverse or propitious)
on a comparison of the innate probability of seeking medical care between
those who decided to buy PHI and those who decided not to buy it. However,
one does not observe the innate probability of seeking medical care, but rather
whether an individual actually uses medical care. Hence, we use actual
health care use as a proxy for innate probability of seeking medical care.
Unfortunately, this test could overestimate adverse selection. Individuals
with PHI might use health care services more often than individuals without
PHI because they enjoy better access conditions (e.g., less waiting time) and
not because they have a higher innate probability of seeking medical care.
This is the classical problem of distinguishing between moral hazard and
adverse selection. Our strategy in this respect is described next.
Our test for adverse/propitious selection will compare the probability of
using health care services for those who purchase PHI directly with that
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for those who receive it as a fringe benet from their employer. Because
these two groups enjoy PHI, di¤erences in health care use cannot be due to
di¤erences in the coverage generosity (access conditions, waiting times, etc.)
but are due to di¤erences in the innate probability of seeking medical care.
Our preferred variable to measure health care use is hospitalisation, though
we also show results for GP services. However, note that GP services are not
covered by PHI.
To be more precise, our test splits the population into two groups: those
who must decide whether to buy PHI or not (or group D, for deciders) and
those who receive PHI from their employer as a fringe benet (or group N,
for non deciders). Our assumption is that, conditional on covariates and
being employed, individuals who belong to the N-group have the same in-
nate probability of seeking medical care as individuals who belong to the
D-group. Group D can again be divided into two subgroups: those who pur-
chase PHI (group DI) and those who do not (group DN). Since individuals in
group D decide whether or not to buy PHI, their behaviour should follow our
theoretical model. Consequently, if information is asymmetric then adverse
selection should be observed (the probability of health care use in group DI
should be higher than the population average, i.e. than in group N). Con-
versely, if information is symmetric, propitious selection should be observed
(the probability of health care use in group DI should be lower than in group
N). Notice that if the di¤erence in the probability of health care use between
groups N and DI were not signicantly di¤erent from zero then one could
only conclude that the data are not informative enough to discern whether
selection is adverse or propitious, and consequently whether information is
symmetric or not. This is strikingly di¤erent from the tests performed under
the complements or fully private framework, where a non-signicant correla-
tion between health care use and insurance coverage is taken as evidence of
symmetric information.
26
Our testing strategy is subject to three validity threats: (1) the innate
probability of seeking medical care of the N-group might be di¤erent from
the D-groups; (2) N-group individuals receive more preventive care because
their employers are especially conscious of their employeeshealth and hence
they promote the take-up of preventive care by their employees; and (3)
the coverage, and therefore the access conditions, provided by PHI contracts
might be di¤erent between the N-group and the DI-group. We will address
these concerns in subsection 4.6, after we have shown the results on the type
of selection (adverse or propitious).
The regression models that we estimate control for age, age squared,
smoking status, marital status, education, log-labour earnings, occupation,
industry, plant size, pension o¤er, wave, region dummies, and a third-order
polynomial in the number of months that have elapsed between the interview
and 1 September of the year prior to the interview (see Table A1 of Appendix
C for the denitions of the variables). We use this last variable because
individuals are asked about visits to the GP and hospitalisations since 1
September of the year previous to the interview, and consequently timing of
the interview induces individual variation in the length of the reference period
of health care use variables. The individuals occupation refers to whether it
is managerial, professional, technical, clerical, and so on. Regarding industry
variables, the BHPS uses the 1980 Standard Industrial Classication before
the twelfth wave, and the 1992 Standard Industrial Classication from wave
12 onwards.14 Table A2 of Appendix C provides the distribution of employer-
provided PHI by occupation and industry. Note that a subset of the variables
that we include in the regressions (age, occupation, smoking status, and place
14We use two sets of dummy variables for industry, one based on the 1980 classication
and the other on the 1992 classication. The set of dummy variables based on the 1980
classication take the value 0 for all waves from the twelfth inclusive. The set of dummy
variables based on the 1992 classication take the value 0 for all waves before the twelfth.
This strategy minimises the possibility of bias at the expense of some e¢ ciency loss.
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of residence) are used by insurers to set premiums. We do not include health
variables because they are not used to price policies.15
In our preferred specication, the sample is restricted to individuals that
bought PHI directly and individuals that obtained PHI from their employer
as a fringe benet. However, in some regressions we include all male em-
ployees aged 23-59, and consequently we specify di¤erent dummy variables
for individuals without PHI (DN-group), individuals with employer-provided
PHI (N-group), individuals that obtain PHI through a relative and individ-
uals that have their insurance premium deducted from their wages. The
di¤erences in the probability of hospitalisation are measured against the de-
fault category: those who bought PHI directly (DI-group).
We refrain from interpreting the results for those that have their insurance
premium deducted from their wages because it is unclear how to classify
such individuals. On the one hand, they can choose whether or not to buy
PHI, and hence they could be classied as part of the group that buy PHI
directly. On the other hand, their insurance premium might be particularly
low because the purchase is arranged through their employer, and hence they
could also be classied as part of the group that receives PHI as a fringe
benet. We also refrain from interpreting the results for individuals that
obtain PHI through a relative (it is again unclear how to classify them, but
note in any case that only 2:4% individuals in the sample are of this status).
15Only in 2003, the second largest health insurance company in the UK started to use
weight and height when setting the premiums in some of its policies (Foubister et al.,
2006; Blackburn, 2008). However, this appears to have been discontinued since at least
November 2009 (they were not available on the companys website in November 2009). In
general, individual underwriting has not been widely developed (Blackburn, 2008). In any
case, we obtain qualitatively similar results when we restrict our sample to before 2003;
results are available from the authors upon request.
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4.4 Test Results
Table 1 reports di¤erences in the conditional probability of using several types
of health care (hospitalisation, GP visit, and preventive tests) estimated
using Probit models. Panel A restricts the sample to our main groups of
interest: N and DI individuals. First, we focus on column 1, which includes
all of the control variables mentioned above. Column 1 shows that DI-group
individuals are more likely to be hospitalised than N-group individuals, which
is consistent with adverse selection. Specically, individuals with employer-
provided PHI are 2:9 percentage points less likely to have any hospitalisation
(with respect to the group who bought PHI directly). This is a very sizeable
di¤erence (4:9% of individuals in the sample have been hospitalised in the
reference period) that is very precisely estimated (statistically signicant at
the 1% level).
[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
Panel B of Table 1 shows estimated di¤erences in health care use when
we do not restrict the sample to the N- and DI-groups, but we also consider
individuals that obtain PHI via a relative, those that have it deducted from
their wage, and individuals without PHI. The estimates for individuals that
have PHI deducted from their wages are negative but not signicant, and
they seem to be half way between the N-group and the DI-group. This
seems to indicate that it is unclear whether to classify these individuals in
the N- or in the D-group, as our discussion above anticipated.
Comparing the N- and DN-group hospitalisation rates can help us to
provide evidence in favour of our main assumption: individuals who belong
to the N-group have the same innate probability of seeking medical care as
individuals who belong to the D-group. To show evidence on this, we will
exploit that the DN group is the vast majority, 84%, of the D-group. So, one
would expect the hospitalisation rates of N-group individuals to be larger
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but similar to those of DN-group individuals if the following three conditions
hold - adverse selection, absence of moral hazard in hospitalisation, and the
N-group is a random draw from the population (union of D and N group).
Our result in Table 1 is consistent with this. The rst and fourth rows of
column 1 in Panel B show (indirectly) that DN- and N-group individuals
have the same hospitalisation rates (because both are the same relative to
the DI-group rates: 2.4 percentage points less).
We recognize that an alternative set of conditions could explain these
results: moral hazard in hospitalisation is present, and N-group individuals
are particularly healthy. Our results from Tables 2 and 4 will rule out this
alternative explanation. We also note that the absence of moral hazard
in hospitalizations is in line with the well-known Rand Health Insurance
Experiment, which did not nd evidence of moral hazard in hospitalisation
(Manning et al. 1987).
Panel B of Table 1 also shows that DN individuals are less likely to be
hospitalised than DI (2:4 percentage points according to column 1). Under
the hypothesis of absence of moral hazard in hospitalisation, this di¤erence
is also indicative of adverse selection (note that N-group individualshealth
status is irrelevant in this comparison).
Regarding GP services, individuals with employer-provided PHI are less
likely to have seen the GP than individuals that bought PHI directly, though
the di¤erence is only statistically signicant at conventional levels in panel
A of Table 1. This di¤erence is also consistent with the existence of adverse
selection. Columns 7-9 on preventive tests will be useful below (subsection
4.6.2).
4.5 What Is the Source of Asymmetric Information?
As mentioned in Section 2, the theoretical model is agnostic as to why the
innate probability of seeking medical care is heterogeneous across individu-
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als. The heterogeneity in probabilities of health care use could come from
di¤erences in underlying health and/or from di¤erences in tastes that yield
heterogeneity in the propensity to seek medical care for a given level of health.
Next, we examine this issue and try to determine the source of heterogeneity
in the probability of health care use that we found in Table 1. To do this, we
will use information on the number of health problems that the individual
declares to su¤er from, as well as on the importance given to healthby the
individual, which we see as related to the individuals preference for health
and health care use.
Table 2 shows that there are no statistically signicant di¤erences in the
probability of su¤ering from at least one health problem (columns 1-3) or in
the number of health problems (columns 4-6) across insurance groups.16 In
particular, there are no di¤erences between the health problems su¤ered by
those without PHI and those that buy it directly in the market (Table A3
in the Appendix C shows that both of our health problem variables are very
strongly correlated with health care use and income). The point estimates
are very close to zero, and the sizes of the condence intervals are reasonably
small. Hence, it seems unlikely that the evidence of adverse selection that
Table 1 showed is due to di¤erences in health status. In this regard, it
seems that the common practice by insurers of excluding pre-existing health
conditions from coverage, and/or the variables used to price the insurance
contracts, are working well and prevent adverse selection due to health status.
[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
A much more complicated task for insurers would be to measure/observe
individuals preferences for health care, which could then be the source
16The respondent is given a list of health problems and must indicate which ones he is
su¤ering from. The list includes problems with arms or legs, di¢ culty seeing or hearing,
skin conditions, asthma or bronchitis, cardiovascular problems, problems with the stom-
ach, liver or kidnies; diabetes, anxiety or depression, alcohol or drug problems, epilepsy,
migraine or frequent headaches, cancer; stroke, and other.
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of asymmetric information. In fact, attitudes towards medical care, beliefs
about treatment e¢ cacy, perceptions about illness, and fear and concern
about medical treatment are factors used in psychology to explain health
care use (Andersen and Newman, 1973; Kirscht, 1983; Elderman, 2000).17
We use whether or not the individual says that health is very important for
him to shed light on this issue. We think of this variable as being directly re-
lated to the individuals attitude towards health and indirectly to his attitude
towards medical treatment. For instance, we would think that individuals
who give more importance to their health will be less likely to adopt a wait
and seestrategy when they start su¤ering from an illness symptom. Col-
umn 1 of Table 3 (Panel B) shows that individuals who bought PHI directly
in the market are more likely to answer that health is very important for
them than individuals with employer-provided PHI (6:3 percentage points
di¤erence) and than individuals without PHI (9:3 percentage points di¤er-
ence). Admittedly, some of the results are only signicant at the 10% level,
but this is because the health importance question is only available in waves 8
and 13 so the sample size is much smaller than in Table 1 (4; 534 observations
in Table 3 vs. 30; 501 in Table 1).
Columns 3-6 of Table 3 show that the probability of hospitalisation is
higher for individuals who responded that health was very important for
them (this is mostly obvious from estimates in Panel B, which includes all
insurance groups in the sample; note that the sample size is much smaller in
Panel A).18 Columns 7-10 report the results for any visit to the GP, which
17Quoting Elderman (2002) Indeed, there is wide individual variation in the tendency
to seek formal health care, some people being more inclined to adopt a "wait and see"
strategy, while others seek care on a regular basis without there being any evident pathol-
ogy to explain the symptoms. It is illustrative to consider the extremes: blood-injury
phobia that delays and/or causes medical care avoidance, and abnormal illness behaviour
(including hypochondriacal concerns) that causes excessive health care use.
18We believe that it is legitimate to include individuals in all insurance groups because
the variable of interest (importance attributed to health) is related to preferences directly.
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is also positively correlated with the importance attributed to health but is
only statistically signicant, at the 10% level, when we use visits to the GP
in the following wave (we use the following wave to minimize the risk that
it is health care use that is a¤ecting the importance attributed to health by
the individual).
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
To sum up, individuals who respond that health is very important for
them are more likely to use health care services, and are also more likely
to have bought PHI directly in the market. This implies that the variable
importance given to health, which is likely to reect preferences for health
as well as health care use, might be a source of asymmetric information and
might be causing part of the observed adverse selection
4.6 Threats to Validity
4.6.1 Representativeness of the comparison group
We use the panel structure of our data to provide evidence in favour of our
key assumption: individuals who belong to the N-group have the same in-
nate probability of seeking medical care as individuals who belong to the
D-group.19 For that purpose, we compare the health care use and health
status between D- and N-group individuals. It is important to take into ac-
count that moral hazard might complicate the comparison, as all N-group
individuals enjoy better access conditions to hospitalisations than DN-group
individuals. This problem is alleviated if, for N-group individuals, we use
only those observations before they got employer-provided PHI. The rea-
son is that, at that point, only a minority of them would have PHI (which
19A similar assumption to ours has been maintained by Ettner (1997) and Cardon and
Hendel (2001) for the US where employer-provided PHI plays a much more important role
than in the UK.
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was directly bought by them).20 The top panel of Table 4 shows that the
health care use and health status of individuals who will go on to having
employer-provided PHI in the future is not statistically di¤erent from that of
individuals who will never have employer-provided PHI. The standard errors
are similar to those in Tables 1 and 2, but the point estimates are much
smaller. In particular, the point estimates for hospitalisations (our preferred
measure) are very close to zero. Overall, there is no indication that those
who will have employer-provided PHI in the future used health care services
less than D-group individuals.
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
As we saw in Panel B of Table 1, whether moral hazard is present or not
is important for the interpretation of some of our results. To shed light on
this, panel B of Table 4 shows the same comparison as in panel A but after
N-group individuals have obtained employer-provided PHI. Consequently,
moral hazard could potentially play an important role in this comparison
because all N individuals have employer-provided PHI. However, we nd that
the di¤erences in hospitalisation rates between D-group individuals and N-
group individuals are also very small and not statistically di¤erent from zero.
There are no statistically signicant di¤erences in visits to the GP or health
status either. The fact that the di¤erences in hospitalisation rates in panel B
are very similar to those in panel A provide further evidence of the absence
of moral hazard in hospitalisations (which was one of the assumptions that
we used to interpret the ndings of Table 1, panel B). Taken together, the
20In this case, the percentage of individuals with PHI (directly purchased) in the N-
group (D-group) is 10:6% (5:9%). This di¤erence is not large enough for moral hazard to
confound the interpretation of the comparison in practice. This is partly because moral
hazard e¤ects tend to be either small or moderate. A back-of-the-envelope calculation
shows very clearly that moral hazard is unlikely to be a problem. In the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment, the di¤erence in the probability of hospitalisation between the free
health care plan and the 95% cost-sharing plan was 0.024, which when multiplied by 0.047
gives an approximate di¤erence of 0.001 in the probability of hospitalisation due to moral
hazard.
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results from both panels of Table 4 provide support to our main assumption
that N-group individuals have the same innate probability of seeking medical
care as individuals who belong to the D-group.
We further provide evidence on the representativeness of our comparison
group by testing the sensitivity of our estimates to the exclusion of several
covariates. Our key assumption might be violated if fringe benets are pos-
itively correlated with productivity, which might be related to health. Note
that this is not necessarily a problem for our empirical strategy because (1)
asymmetric information does not seem to be caused by health but by het-
erogeneity in preferences related to health care use and (2) we control for
individual labour earnings which will be strongly correlated with individual
productivity. To investigate how sensitive our estimates are to the omission
of worker productivity, we estimate models of health care use in which we
purposefully omit variables that are almost surely correlated with worker
productivity. In columns 2-3 and 5-6 of Table 1, we report estimates that
exclude some of the control variables that we used in our preferred spec-
ications (columns 1 and 4) such as industry and occupation, plant size,
earnings, smoking status, and education. The di¤erences in the probabil-
ity of health care use hardly change at all when we omit these important
variables (especially in Panel A which focuses on the sample we are most
interested in). Note that this strategy only provides valuable information if
some of the excluded variables are correlated with having employer-provided
PHI. According to Table 5, while education is not conditionally correlated
with having employer-provided PHI, labour market variables such as indus-
try, occupation, plant size and earnings are. However, as we have just seen,
whether we include them or not in the regressions hardly makes any di¤er-
ence to our estimates of adverse selection (Table 1). The fact that we obtain
the same results independently of whether or not we include earnings and job
characteristics (industry, occupation, pension o¤er, and plant size) in the re-
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gressions of Table 1 seems to conrm that the asymmetric information is not
the result of health status heterogeneity (which is correlated with earnings,
as Table A3 in Appendix C indicates) but of heterogeneity in the preferences
for health and health care.
[TABLE 5 AROUND HERE]
Another possible source of bias in our comparison could be that employees
with worse health status sought out jobs o¤ering employer-provided PHI. If
this bias were present, it would go in our favour in the sense that would be
underestimating the extent of adverse selection (see also Ettner 1997).
4.6.2 Di¤erences in preventive e¤ort
A legitimate concern would be that rms that o¤er PHI as a fringe benet also
promote the take-up of preventive health care services, which might result
in a lower hospitalisation probability for individuals with employer-provided
PHI. Columns 7-9 of Table 1 show di¤erences in the probability that an
individual took at least one preventive test in the last year. Overall, the
results show no di¤erences in the use of preventive tests between individuals
with employer-provided PHI and individuals who bought PHI directly in the
market (the point estimates are close to zero and the condence intervals are
reasonably narrow).
4.6.3 Di¤erences in the coverage of the contracts
Above we have found that group DI individuals use health care services
more than group N individuals. This is consistent with adverse selection,
but it is also consistent with a situation in which directly purchased policies
are more generous than employer-provided policies (they could o¤er better
access to health care). There are ve reasons why we think that the latter
does not hold. The rst two rely on further empirical exploitation of our
data, the third and fourth on theoretical grounds, and the fth relies on
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existing empirical research on the PHI market in the UK. We now elaborate
on these arguments in turn.
First, as mentioned above, our results show that individuals who bought
PHI directly have a higher probability of using a GP (Table 1, Panel A,
columns 4-6). Given that GP services are not covered by PHI, this di¤erence
should be due to underlying di¤erences in the propensity to use health care
services.
Secondly, we exploit the fact that individuals with PHI are still eligible to
be treated under the NHS to investigate whether they are treated under the
NHS or under their PHI, which will depend on the benets and costs of each
option including the generosity of their private insurance coverage (Propper,
2000). According to Table 6, conditional on having a hospitalisation, indi-
viduals with employer-provided PHI are less likely than those with directly
bought PHI to be treated under the NHS, though the di¤erence is not statis-
tically signicant.21 This result suggests that, if anything, employer-provided
policies are more generous than directly bought ones. Admittedly, condition-
ing on hospitalisation raises the issue of sample selection bias, and hence the
results must be interpreted with that in mind.
[TABLE 6 AROUND HERE]
Third, it is known that administrative costs per insurance policy are
much higher in the individual market than in the corporate market. Hence,
one would expect employer-provided PHI to be closer to full insurance than
individually bought policies. A su¢ cient condition for this to be true is that
the administrative load be proportional to the premium. Then, for the same
level of coverage, the premium of the individual market insurance policy will
be higher than the corporate market one.
Fourth, we know from our theoretical model that group DI individuals
21Because the sample size is small, we use a reduced number of control variables in this
regression.
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will obtain full insurance. The issue is whether group N individuals also
obtain full insurance or not. The most straightforward theoretical analysis
shows that they do. Indeed, suppose that we want to nd the menu of
contracts that maximises average employee welfare subject to (i) ensuring a
xed prot to the insurance company and (ii) keeping the risk mix in the rm
xed. It turns out that this menu reduces to a single (and therefore pooling)
full-coverage contract. In other words, if employers do not use PHI to distort
the risk mix, competition for workers will force employers to o¤er a full-
coverage contract. Indeed, it is a widely supported view in the profession
that employer provision of insurance solves the adverse selection problem
directly, without needing to resort to reductions in coverage.22
Fifth, Propper and Maynard (1989, p.11) study the most important fea-
tures of the PHI in Britain. They claim that the benets provided by cor-
porate and individual-purchased PHI policies are very similar. This seems
to remain true in most PHI policies but, in the mid-noughties, some small
private insurers started to o¤er budget policiesthat o¤ered lower premiums
and higher deductibles (Blackburn, 2008). These budget policies have been
more popular in the individual market than in the corporate market.23 This
would indicate that, if anything, deductibles tend to be higher in the individ-
ual than in the corporate market.24 We tend to think that deductibles will
22Directly quoting Bhattacharya and Vogt (2006): For example, the leading health
economics text says "group purchase by employers addresses the problem of adverse
selection," (Folland et al., 2004). This sentiment is repeated in many places (Cutler,
2002; Gruber and Levitt, 2000; Buchmueller and DiNardo, 2002). This is corroborated
by the fact that large group employer-provided insurance does not exclude pre-existing
conditions.
23According to our conversations with market actors, the corporate market is more
competitive and employers could keep premiums low by switching insurer. In contrast,
switching costs are higher in the individual market, which means that individuals tend to
switch to a budget policy within the same insurer when they need to reduce the cost of
their PHI premium.
24Several industry sources have conrmed this to us though there are no available sta-
tistics on it. They claim that it is not in the interest of the employer for the employee to
delay treatment.
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have little impact on hospitalisations, but if they have any it would mean
that we are underestimating adverse selection.
5 Conclusions
Using a theoretical model of health insurance where a public and a private
option coexist, we link whether information is symmetric or asymmetric with
the type of selection observed in the market (propitious or adverse). In par-
ticular we have shown that if information is symmetric (asymmetric) then
propitious (adverse) selection should be observed. Hence, one can indirectly
test for the presence of informational asymmetries by empirically measuring
the type of selection in a given PHI market. We have applied this to the
UK, where the very important assumption that underlies our results is sat-
ised, namely the public option is nanced through compulsory and general
taxation and constitutes a substitutive option with respect to the private
one. Since we nd signicant adverse selection, this leads us to conclude
that informational asymmetries are indeed present in the UKs PHI market.
We have extended our analysis to cover cases with additional sources of
heterogeneity. While some sources of heterogeneity reinforce our theoretical
conclusions, others potentially go against them. We are condent about
our main theoretical conclusions however, because several conditions would
need to simultaneously hold in order to reverse them, and moreover there is
evidence that some of these conditions do not hold in practice.
We test for adverse selection among male employees by comparing the
use of hospital and GP services amongst those who receive PHI as a fringe
benet and those who buy it directly. We nd strong evidence of adverse
selection. When we investigate the source of adverse selection, we nd that it
is caused by di¤erences in preferences rather than di¤erences in underlying
health. A possible explanation is that the practice by insurers of excluding
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pre-existing conditions (together with the variables that they use for pricing)
is being successful at removing the asymmetric information in health status.
However, it is intuitive that it will be much more di¢ cult for insurers to
eliminate the asymmetric information in preferences for health/medical care.
We rule out three alternative explanations of our results. First, our results
are not due to the comparison group being healthier (conditional on covari-
ates) than the general population. Second, we also rule out that our results
are driven by di¤erences in preventive e¤ort. Third, we can also rule out
that individually purchased contracts o¤er better coverage than employer-
provided health insurance contracts.
Our nding that adverse selection is present in the UK PHI market is
important for two reasons. First, the nding is a contribution in itself since
recent empirical literature has found mixed support for this phenomenon in
other markets. Second, it has at least two important implications: the risk
mix that prevails in the publicly funded NHS, and therefore the costs borne
by the government, greatly depend on whether selection into PHI is adverse
or propitious. Moreover, since the presence of adverse selection allows us
to infer that informational asymmetries exist, we can apply several results
that are present in markets with such asymmetries. Namely, several authors
have shown that if asymmetric information is present then one can increase
welfare by appropriately imposing taxes on the contracts intended for the low
risks while subsidising the contracts intended for the high risks (see Crocker
and Snow, 1985; Olivella and Vera-Hernández, 2007).
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APPENDICES A and B 
Appendix A. Technical details
A.1 Contracts in the nal wealths space
Recall that if an individual has purchased a PHI contract (`; q), his nal
wealths are a = w   `  q and n = w   q. It is easy to check that these two
equations can be expressed as q = w   n and ` = n   a. Hence, an insurer
attracting a J-risk with a nal-wealth contract (n; a) expects to obtain
J(n; a) = q   pJ(`0   `) = w   n  pJ(`0   n+ a).
Isoprots in the (n; a) space have slope da=dn =  (1  pJ)=pJ . It is easy to
check that the zero isoprot line goes through the point of neither private nor
public insurance, given by (n; a) = (w;w   `0) and denoted by A in Figure
1. Zero isoprot lines are also depicted in Figure 1 and labelled J() = 0
for J = L;H. Notice that in the presence of the public health insurance,
the status-quo point of an individual is not A but (w;w   `PUB). This is
the nal wealth vector associated with the public option and we denote this
point as P . In Figure 1, each point on the vertical line through n = w is a
possible position of P . As `PUB decreases (or as public coverage increases),
P lies at a higher point on this vertical line. If `PUB = `0, we are back to the
no-insurance point A. By virtue of the change of variable performed above,
an individuals expected utility is given by UJ(n; a) = pJu(a)+ (1 pJ)u(n).
His marginal rate of substitution between states is given by
da
dn
 
@UJ (n;a)
@n
@UJ (n;a)
@a
=  1  pJ
pJ
u0(n)
u0(a)
.
In Figure 1 we depict one indi¤erence curve for each type. The slope of an
indi¤erence curve at the 45-degree line is  1 pJ
pJ
, and coincides with the slope
of the corresponding isoprot. Therefore e¢ ciency is attained for any con-
tract in the 45-degree line. This corresponds to contracts with full coverage,
where n = a, or equivalently, where ` = 0.
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In subsection 3.4.3 we allow individuals to di¤er in losses as well as in
the risk of becoming ill. The change of variable for an individual of type
JK = HH;HL;LH;LL implies solving the following system of equations
for c and P :
a = w   `K   P + c
n = w   P:
This yields
P = w   n
c = a  n+ `K .
Using these expressions, the zero isoprot line associated with attracting a
type JK, or P   pJ`K = 0, can be expressed as
a =
w
pJ
  `K   n1  pJ
pJ
.
The point of no insurance is type-dependent. Indeed, if n = w, then a =
w `K . Hence AK = (w;w `K). If all types receive the same coverage cPUB
in the public outside option, this option becomes PK = (w;w  `K + cPUB),
which is again type-dependent.
A.2 The competitive equilibrium under symmetric information
In the absence of a public option, the coordinates of equilibrium contracts
fH ; Lg are derived as follows. E¢ ciency implies that nJ = aJ for all
J = L;H. Zero prots per individual implies J(nJ ; aJ) = w   aJ  
pJ`0 = 0 for all J = L;H. Hence, aJ = nJ = w   pJ`0 and fH ; Lg =
f(w   pH`0; w   pH`0); (w   pL`0; w   pL`0)g.
A.3 Isoprots under complementary PHI
Under complementary PHI, the expected prot of an insurer committing to
implementing a nal loss equal to ` to a type J 2 fL;Hg in exchange for
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premium q is given by q   pJ (`PUB   `), since the insurer only bears the
reduction in loss not already covered by public services. To change variables,
solve for q and ` in fa = w   q   `; n = w   qg and substitute into the zero
prot condition to obtain w   n = pJ (`PUB   n+ a), or
a =
w   n
pJ
+ n  `PUB. (1)
Hence, da=dn =  (1   pJ)=pJ as usual. If ` = `PUB (zero private coverage
in the PHI contract) then q = 0. In that case n = w and, using (1), a =
w `PUB. Zero isoprots stem from point (n; a) = (w;w   `PUB), or point B
in Figure 5, which corresponds to an individual only enjoying public health
care. If the individual does not enjoy any care at all then (n; a) = (w;w   `0),
or point A in Figure 5
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Let H0 = (w; aH) and L0 = (w; aL). We need to prove that aH < aL, or
equivalently that u(aH) < u(aL). Now H0 satises UH(w; aH) = UH(H).
This implies pHu(aH) + (1  pH)u(w) = u(w   pH`0). Similarly, L0 satises
UL(w; aL) = U
L(L). This implies pLu(aL) + (1   pL)u(w) = u(w   pL`0).
Solving for u(aH) and u(aL), we need to prove that
u(aH) =
u(w   pH`0)  (1  pH)u(w)
pH
<
u(w   pL`0)  (1  pL)u(w)
pL
= u(aL).
After some manipulation, this can be rewritten as
u(w   pL`0) > pL
pH
u(w   pH`0) + u(w)pH   pL
pH
. (2)
Let x1 = w pH`0, x2 = w, p1 = pLpH , and p2 =
pH pL
pH
. Notice that 0 < p1 < 1,
0 < p2 < 1 and p1 + p2 = 1, so that (p1; p2) is a system of probabilities. Let
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Ep() be the expectation operator associated with these probabilities. Notice
that Ep(x)  p1x1 + p2x2 = w   pL`0. Therefore, expression (2) can be
rewritten as
u(Ep(x)) > Ep(u(x)).
This is true by Jensens inequality and the fact that u() is strictly concave.
Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1. We prove rst that no contract outside the set fP; L; Hg can be-
long to an ESAC. In other words, any ESAC must be a subset of fP; L; Hg.
Under symmetric information, the private market is segmented. Fix a type
J = L;H. Suppose, by contradiction, that in equilibrium the private sec-
tor attracts some individuals of type J with contract 0 6= J . Then
UJ(0) > U
J(P ) and moreover 0 either does not yield zero prots or is
not e¢ cient, since if both were false then e¢ ciency and zero prot would im-
ply that 0 = J . Take the rst case, where prots are positive. Then there
exists " > 0 such that 0 = 0+"

1
1

and UJ(0) > UJ(0) > UJ(P ), so 0
monopolises all individuals of type J and still makes positive prots per con-
sumer if " is small enough, contradiction. Suppose now that 0 is not e¢ cient.
Then there exists another contract 0 such that UJ(0) > UJ(0)  UJ(P )
and J(0) > J(0) (and 0 monopolises all individuals of type J), contra-
diction.
Step 2. We now prove the proposition on a case-by-case basis.
Proof of part (a). Suppose that P is below H0 in Figure 1. We prove rst
that fL; Hg is indeed an ESAC. Suppose that J is o¤ered in exclusivity
to type J individuals, which is possible since types are publicly observable
here. Since UJ(J) > U
J(P ) for all J , we have that both L and 

H are
active. If any other contract is o¤ered by an insurer with exclusivity to some
type J , this contract will either attract no one or will result in losses, by
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construction of J . We prove now that no other ESAC exists. By Step 1
any ESAC must be a subset of fP; L; Hg. Consider fP; L; Hg. Notice
that P is inactive, which violates condition (i) of the denition of an ESAC.
Consider fP; Jg for some J . Again P is inactive. Consider fPg. Since P
lies below the indi¤erence curve going through J , 8J , we have that, for "
small enough, an insurer o¤ering 0 = J   "

1
1

with exclusivity for type
J makes positive prots.
Proof of part (b). Suppose that P is on or above point H0 but strictly below
point L0 in Figure 1. We start by proving that fP; Lg is an ESAC. Suppose
an insurer o¤ers a contract with exclusivity for high risks. By Assumption
1, to attract high risks it must lie strictly above the high risk indi¤erence
curve UH. By construction such a contract will result in losses. Suppose
an insurer deviates by o¤ering a contract with exclusivity for low risks. To
attract low risks it must lie on or above curve UL. No such contract will
make positive prots. We now prove that fP; Lg is the only ESAC. No
ESAC may contain H , because all low risks prefer P to 

H and high risks
choose P out of indi¤erence by Assumption 1. Then by Step 1 an ESAC
must be a subset of fP; Lg. Consider fPg. Since P lies below L0, we have
that, for " small enough, an insurer o¤ering 0 = L "

1
1

makes positive
prots. Consider fLg. If insurers o¤er L with exclusivity to low risks, high
risks will be attracted by P , so it should belong to the ESAC, contradiction.
If insurers o¤er L to the whole population, then high risks will also pick
this contract, and hence insurers will su¤er losses. The only other possible
subset is the same fP; Lg, and we are done.
Proof of part (c). Suppose that P is on or above L0 in Figure 1 To see that
fPg is an ESAC, notice that any private o¤er that attracts individuals of
any type will su¤er losses. To see that fPg is the only ESAC, pick any other
set of contracts. Since P is an outstanding o¤er, neither L nor 

H can be
active. By Step 1 we are done.
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Proof of Lemma 2
This lemma is a straightforward consequence of the single-crossing condition.
The proof is therefore omitted.
Proof of Proposition 2
A few statements are proved as preliminary steps.
Step 1. If the private sector attracts any individual at all in equilibrium, it
must do so at zero average prot per individual.
Suppose by contradiction that the ESAC S includes a contract  o¤ered
by the private sector that makes prots  > 0 per individual. Since the
premise is that it is active, it must attract individuals with types in some
set T and be rejected by the rest of types, i.e., in the complement of T (TC
henceforth) which could be empty, as in the case where  is pooling. In other
words,
(i) for all J 2 T , we have UJ()  UJ(0) for all 0 2 S [ fPg.
(ii) for all J 2 TC , we have UJ()  UJ(0) for some 0 2 S [ fPg.
Due to the single-crossing condition, there is always a deviating contract
 arbitrarily close to  that
(iii) will be preferred to  by all types in T , i.e., UJ() > UJ() for all
J 2 T ;
(iv) will be dispreferred to  by all types in TC , i.e., UJ() < UJ() for
all J 2 TC ;
so we can write
(i) for all J 2 T , we have UJ() > UJ(0) for all 0 2 S [ fPg;
(ii) for all J 2 TC , we have UJ() < UJ(0) for some 0 2 S [ fPg.
To sum up,  will attract and repel the same types of individuals as contract
, but will monopolize all the individuals of any type in T . Since  can
be made arbitrarily close to , we nd that prots per individual  are
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arbitrarily close to  (by continuity), whereas the number of individuals
attracted is multiplied due to monopolisation. Thus  constitutes a protable
deviation from S.
Step 2. If the private sector attracts some high risks and no low risks in
equilibrium through some contract , this contract must be e¢ cient.
We have already proved that it should yield zero prots. Suppose by contra-
diction that contract  is not e¢ cient but attracts high risks in equilibrium.
Then UJ()  UJ(0) for all 0 2 S [ fPg. Since  is not e¢ cient, there
exists another contract  that yields higher prots and attracts all high risks
and may or may not attract low risks. In both cases  constitutes a protable
deviation.
Step 3. There does not exist an equilibrium where the private sector attracts
both types of individuals through a single contract .
By Step 1 such a contract would have to make zero prots on average per
individual. Moreover, by Assumption 1 it must be true that UJ() > UJ(P )
for all J . Due to the single-crossing condition, a contract  always exists
that is preferred to  by low risks and at the same time it is dispreferred to
 by high risks. Therefore  will also be preferred to P by low risks, while
high risks stick to . Hence  constitutes a protable deviation.
Step 4. In equilibrium, if a contract attracts type J only, it must yield zero
prots per client.
By Step 1 we know that if  is active, on average it must make zero prots.
Now suppose that it makes positive prots per low risk and negative prots
per high risk. Then this contract must be a pooling one. By Step 3 this can
never be part of an equilibrium.
Step 5. If the private sector attracts high risks, it must be through contract
H .
This follows directly from Steps (4) and (2).
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We turn now to characterising the competitive equilibrium, case by case.
The proof is based on Figure 2.
Case (a). P lies below point L1
We prove rst that f^L; Hg is indeed an ESAC in the presence of such
package P . We must prove that it cannot be the case that a deviation
from f^L; Hg that was unprotable in the absence of P (before) becomes
protable once P is present (now). This could only happen in the following
ways.
1.1 The deviation did not attract any consumers before and now it not
only attracts consumers but also does so in a protable way.
1.2 The deviation attracted some high risks before, but in an unprotable
way, whereas now it still attracts them but in a protable way.
1.3. The deviation attracted some low risks before, but in an unprotable
way, whereas now it still attracts them but in a protable way.
1.4. The deviation attracted both risks before, but in an unprotable way,
whereas now it only attracts low risks, thus making the deviation protable.
We now prove that none of these statements is possible. Statement 1.1
is impossible because if a contract  did not attract anyone in the absence
of P , the presence of this alternative cannot make consumers more willing
to accept contract . Statements 1.2 and 1.3 are impossible because the
per-client prots of attracting a given risk are independent of the existence
of an alternative contract P . Statement 1.4 requires that
(i) package P attracts the high risks that otherwise would have picked ,
i.e., UH(P )  UH();
(ii) contract  attracts some or all low risks, i.e.,
UL() MaxfUL(^L); UL(P )g;
(iii) contract  is protable when it attracts a low risk, i.e., L() > 0.
Now (i) and (ii) imply UH(P )  UH()  UL(P ). The single-crossing
condition implies that  is on or to the right of the vertical line going through
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A (autarky) and P . Also, (ii) and (iii) imply that UL()  UL(^L) and
L() > 0. By inspection of Figure 2, this implies that  lies in the lens
formed by isoprot L() = 0 and indi¤erence curve bUL. This lens is strictly
to the left of the vertical line going through A, which leads to a contradiction.
Let us now prove that f^L; Hg is the unique ESAC in the presence of
P . We begin by showing that P cannot belong to an ESAC. Suppose it does.
If it attracts high risks, all other contracts in the ESAC must lie below the
high risk indi¤erence curve going through P , UHP henceforth. Since P lies
below L1, curve UHP and isoprot H() = 0 form a lens. Any deviation
in the interior of the lens will attract high risks and bring positive prots,
contradiction. As a corollary, the private sector must be attracting the high
risks. By Step 5 this implies that the private sector is o¤ering H . Suppose
now that P attracts low risks. Then, again since P is on the vertical line
through w and below L1, we nd that an area appears between the low risk
indi¤erence curve going through P , the indi¤erence curve UH, and isoprot
L() = 0. Any contract in this area is preferred to P by low risks, it is
dispreferred to H by high risks, and it makes positive prots per low risk,
so it constitutes a protable deviation.
Finally, since only the private sector is active and we have already shown
that the high risks must be attracted by H , then the only other incentive
compatible contract L that attracts low risks and yields zero prots must
lie on the segment ^LA. If it coincides with ^L, we are done. If is strictly
below, an area appears between the low risk indi¤erence curve going through
L, the indi¤erence curve UH, and isoprot L() = 0. Any contract in this
area constitutes a protable deviation, and we are done. This proves part
(a) of the proposition.
Case (b). P coincides with or is above point L1 but strictly below H0
We prove rst that fP; Hg is indeed an ESAC. If a deviation is to attract
low risks (and perhaps other risks as well) it must lie strictly above the
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indi¤erence curve bUL, by Assumption 1. Contracts in region IV (including
those in the cord joining H0 and ^L) will bring losses even from low risks.
Contracts in region V (except those in the cord joining H0 and ^L) will
attract all risks and yield non-positive prots even from low risks. Finally,
consider a deviation to a contract in region VI. This will attract all risks.
Suppose by contradiction that it makes positive prots on average. Then
this would have been a protable deviation from the f^L; Hg equilibrium
in the absence of P , which contradicts our assumption that the proportion
of low risks is not above the critical value for existence.
We now prove that no other ESAC exists. By contradiction suppose that
S 0 is another ESAC. Suppose that in S 0 the private sector does not attract
high risks. Then all other elements in S 0 must be on or below UHP . Since P
is below H0, a lens is formed between H() = 0 and UHP . A deviation inside
this lens will make positive prots per high risk and attract all high risks,
contradiction. Hence the private sector attracts high risks, and by Step 5 this
means that H must be in S
0. By Assumption 1 and by Step 4, the presence
of P implies that if the private sector is to attract low risks in equilibrium,
it must be through a contract in L() = 0, strictly to the left of ^L, and in
region V. Such a contract will also attract high risks, so by Step 3 this can
never constitute an equilibrium. Hence all low risks choose P . To conclude,
S 0 = fP; Hg. This concludes the proof of part (b) of the proposition.
Notice that if P lies strictly between L1 and H0, the assumption that
 be less than or equal to the critical value (call it ) for existence of an
equilibrium in the purely private model is no longer necessary for existence
here. To see this, x P above L1 and consider the low risk indi¤erence curve
going through P and call it ULP . Then U
L
P lies strictly above bUL. Suppose that
 = 0 is such that the zero isoprot line associated with pooling contracts
is tangent to ULP . This 
0 is strictly above  since  makes the pooling zero
isoprot tangent to bUL. By construction, for any     0, no protable
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deviation exists from the candidate fP; Hg.
Case (c). P coincides with H0 or is above it
We prove rst that fPg is indeed an ESAC. Consider any deviation. If it is
to attract high risks it must lie strictly above the high risk indi¤erence curve
UH. Any such contract will result in losses on high risks. To compensate
for these losses, the deviation must also attract low risks at positive prots.
Since P is well above L1, this implies that the deviation must lie in the
interior of region VI. That such a deviation makes positive prots on average
violates the assumption that   .
Let us show now that no other ESAC exists. Suppose that the private sec-
tor attracts high risks. Then this contract must be H , by Step 5. However,
by Assumption 1, contract H cannot be active because P is on or above H0.
The proof that the private sector cannot attract low risks in equilibrium is
the same as for case (b).
Proof of Lemma 3
Let HH0 = (w; aH) and LL0 = (w; aL). We need to prove that aH < aL,
or equivalently that uH(aH) < uL(aL). Now HH0 satises UHH(w; aH) =
UHH(H). This implies pHuH(aH) + (1   pH)uH(w) = uH(w   pH`0). Sim-
ilarly, LL0 satises ULL(w; aL) = ULL(L). This implies pLuL(aL) + (1  
pL)uL(w) = uL(w  pL`0). Solving for uH(aH) and uL(aL), we need to prove
that
uH(aH) =
uH(w   pH`0)  (1  pH)uH(w)
pH
<
uL(w   pL`0)  (1  pL)uL(w)
pL
= uL(aL).
After some manipulation, this can be rewritten as
uL(w   pL`0) > pL
pH
uH(w   pH`0) + (1  pL)uL(w)  pL
pH
(1  pH)uH(w).
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We can now add 0 = (1  pL)uH(w)  (1  pL)uH(w) to the right hand side
and pull together the terms containing uH(w) to obtain
uL(w pL`0) > pL
pH
uH(w pH`0)+(1 pL)uL(w)+pH   pL
pH
uH(w) (1 pL)uH(w).
Add uH(w   pL`0)  uL(w   pL`0) to both sides to obtain
uH(w   pL`0) > pL
pH
uH(w   pH`0)+
+
pH   pL
pH
uH(w)  (1  pL) (uH(w)  uL(w)) + uH(w   pL`0)  uL(w   pL`0).
By continuity, if uH (z) and uL (z) are su¢ ciently close to each other for all
z, the previous condition is implied by
uH(w   pL`0) > pL
pH
uH(w   pH`0) + pH   pL
pH
uH(w).
In order to prove the last inequality, apply the arguments used after expres-
sion (2) in the proof of Lemma (1) to the function u = uH .
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APPENDIX C 
Additional tables 
 
Table A1. Average and Definition of Variables 
Name Definition Mean 
Insurance Variables 
PHI provided 
by employer 
1 if the individual has PHI in his own name provided by his employer as a 
fringe benefit, 0 otherwise (N-group) 
0.142 
PHI deducted 
from wages 
1 if the individual has PHI in his own name and pays the premium directly 
through his wage, 0 otherwise 
0.038 
PHI obtained 
through relative 
1 if the individual has PHI in a relative’s name, 0 otherwise 0.024 
Without PHI 1 if the individual does not have PHI, 0 otherwise (DN-group) 0.739 
PHI Ind 1 if the individual bought PHI directly, 0 otherwise (DI-group) 0.057 
Health care use variables 
Hospitalization 1 if the individual has been hospitalised since 1 September of the year 
previous to the interview, 0 otherwise 
0.049 
Any visit to the 
GP 
1 if the individual has had at least one visit to the GP since 1 September of 
the year previous to the interview, 0 otherwise 
0.615 
Any preventive 
test 
1 if the individual has had at least one preventive test or check-up since 1 
of September of the year previous to the interview, 0 otherwise 
0.827 
NHS funded 
hospitalisation 
1 if the individual had a hospitalisation fully funded by the NHS since 1 of 
September of the year previous to the interview, 0 otherwise (only defined 
if hospitalisation equals 1) 
0.867 
NHS partially 
funded 
hospitalisation 
1 if the individual had a hospitalisation either fully or partially funded by 
the NHS since 1 of September of the year previous to the interview, 0 
otherwise (only defined if hospitalisation equals 1) 
0.890 
   
Self-declared health variables 
Health very 
important 
1 if the individual declares that health is very important to him, 0 if it is 
less than very important 
0.725 
Any health 
problem 
1 if the individual declares that he has at least one of the 13 health 
problems that are shown to him, 0 otherwise 
0.466 
No. of health 
problems 
Number of health problems (of those shown to him) that the individual 
suffers from 
0.704 
Control variables (other than occupation, industry, plant size, pension offer, region and wave 
dummies) 
Age Age in years 39.52 
Less than O-
level 
1 if the individual has some educational qualification but has not 
completed O-levels, 0 otherwise 
0.049 
O-levels 1 if the individual’s highest qualification is O-levels or apprenticeship, 0 
otherwise 
0.170 
A-levels 1 if the individual’s highest qualification is A-levels, 0 otherwise 0.125 
College 1 if the individual’s highest qualification is college degree, 0 otherwise 0.520 
More than 
college 
1 if the individual’s highest qualification is more than college degree, 0 
otherwise 
0.046 
Smoker 1 if the individual currently smokes, 0 otherwise 0.275 
Cohabiting 1 if the individual is cohabiting (included married), 0 otherwise 0.632 
Earnings Real monthly individual labour income in December 2008 sterling, divided 
by  10000 
0.237 
LN(Earnings) LN(Earnings) -1.575 
Time elapsed Number of months between the interview and 1 of September of the year 
previous to the interview 
13.73 
Notes: The sample includes male employees aged 23-59 resident in England, Wales and Scotland. 
Occupation % with employer 
provided PHI
Industry % with employer 
provided PHI
Manager or administrator 28.7 Agricultural, forestry, fishing, 
mining, manufacturing, utilities
18.4
Professional 16.2 Construction 11.1
Associate professional or 
technical
18.3 Trade, hotels and restaurants 10.8
Clerical 7.3 Transport, storage and 
communication
11.5
Craft 9.0 Financial intermediation 44.0
Personal or protective 
services
2.0 Real estate, renting and 
business activities
23.0
Sales 17.3 Public sector including defence and extra-territorial bodies
4.1
Plant or machine operator 6.4 Education, health and social 
work
1.1
Other occupations 4.5 Other social services and 
housing employees
7.2
Notes: The sample includes male employees aged 23-59 resident in England, Scotland, and Wales. 
Years 2002-2008.
Table A2. Percentage of Individuals that Obtain PHI from their Employer as a Fringe Benefit. 
Breakdown by Occupation and Industry
Table A3. Models that Use Variables Related to Health Problem
Dependent variable: Hospitalisation Any visit to 
the GP
Any health 
problem
No. of 
health 
problems
Any health problem 0.017*** 0.090***
[0.005] [0.015]
Number of health problems 0.015*** 0.116***
[0.002] [0.009]
LN of monthly earnings (2008 £) ‐0.008* 0.001 ‐0.080*** ‐0.177***
[0.004] [0.012] [0.016] [0.032]
Smoker ‐0.004 ‐0.018* 0.004 0.04
[0.004] [0.011] [0.016] [0.031]
PHI provided by employer ‐0.025** ‐0.02 0.023 0.024
[0.012] [0.020] [0.027] [0.058]
PHI deducted from wages ‐0.013 ‐0.005 ‐0.012 ‐0.001
[0.014] [0.023] [0.030] [0.060]
PHI obtained through relative ‐0.007 ‐0.083*** ‐0.057 ‐0.133*
[0.015] [0.030] [0.040] [0.075]
Without PHI ‐0.023** ‐0.048*** ‐0.005 ‐0.033
[0.011] [0.017] [0.023] [0.050]
P‐values of other controls
Education 0.95 0.78 0.73 0.84
Pension offer 0.51 0.04 0.04 0.01
Plant size 0.46 0.84 0.63 0.44
Occupation 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.17
Industry 0.14 0.48 0.19 0.12
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS
Notes: Marginal effects estimated using models indicated at the bottom of each column. Dependent 
variable of each regression is indicated at the top of each column. Sample includes male employees 
aged 23‐59 independently of insurance status.  Control variables included in all regressions are age, 
time elapsed, marital status, wave and region dummies. Sample size is 30,496. Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1. Models of Health Care Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PHI provided by employer (N‐group) ‐0.029*** ‐0.026** ‐0.027** ‐0.046** ‐0.040* ‐0.039* ‐0.019 ‐0.011 0.01
[0.011] [0.012] [0.013] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
PHI provided by employer (N‐group) ‐0.024** ‐0.026** ‐0.028** ‐0.015 ‐0.03 ‐0.036* ‐0.016 ‐0.012 0.006
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
PHI deducted from wages ‐0.013 ‐0.013 ‐0.013 ‐0.007 ‐0.009 ‐0.012 ‐0.022 ‐0.019 ‐0.015
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018]
PHI obtained through relative ‐0.011 ‐0.013 ‐0.012 ‐0.103*** ‐0.104*** ‐0.102*** ‐0.011 ‐0.006 ‐0.011
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
Without PHI (DN‐group) ‐0.024** ‐0.024** ‐0.022* ‐0.051*** ‐0.050*** ‐0.047** ‐0.034*** ‐0.032** ‐0.046***
[0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Controls (both panels)
Industry and occupation Y N N Y N N Y N N
Plant size and pension offer Y N N Y N N Y N N
Earnings Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N
Smoker Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N
Education Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N
Notes: Marginal effects are shown with respect to the default category: directly bought PHI. Each column shows results from two Probit regressions with two different 
samples (as specified in the header of Panel A and Panel B) but with the same set of control variables (as specified in the bottom of the table). Control variables included 
in all regressions are: age, time elapsed, marital status, wave and region dummies. Sample sizes are 6,079 for Panel A regressions, and 30,501 for Panel B regressions. 
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. vble: Any preventive test
Dep. vble: Any preventive test
(Panel A) Sample: male employees aged 23‐59 that have PHI either provided by employer or bought directly
(Panel B) Sample: male employees aged 23‐59 irrespective of PHI
Dep. vble: Hospitalisation Dep. vble: Any visit to the GP
Dep. vble: Hospitalisation Dep. vble: Any visit to the GP
Table 2. Models of Health Problems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PHI provided by employer (N‐group) 0.015 0.006 ‐0.013 ‐0.008 ‐0.016 ‐0.052
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.060] [0.062] [0.058]
PHI provided by employer (N‐group) 0.023 0.006 ‐0.016 0.024 ‐0.003 ‐0.05
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.058] [0.058] [0.057]
PHI deducted from wages ‐0.012 ‐0.027 ‐0.035 ‐0.001 ‐0.025 ‐0.043
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.060] [0.062] [0.062]
PHI obtained through relative ‐0.057 ‐0.052 ‐0.046 ‐0.133* ‐0.118 ‐0.106
[0.040] [0.040] [0.041] [0.075] [0.076] [0.076]
Without PHI (DN‐group) ‐0.005 0.001 0.013 ‐0.033 ‐0.016 0.008
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050]
Controls (both panels)
Industry and occupation Y N N Y N N
Plant size and pension offer Y N N Y N N
Earnings Y Y N Y Y N
Smoker Y Y N Y Y N
Education Y Y N Y Y N
(Panel A) Sample: male employees aged 23‐59 that have PHI either provided by 
employer or bought directly
(Panel B) Sample: male employees aged 23‐59 irrespective of PHI
Dep. vble: Any health problem Dep. vble: Number of health problems
Notes: Marginal effects are shown with respect to the default category: directly bought PHI. Each column shows results from either a 
Probit (columns. 1‐3) or OLS regression (cols. 4‐6)  with two different samples (as specified in the header of Panel A and Panel B) but 
with the same set of control variables (as specified in the bottom of the table). Control variables included in all regressions are: age, 
time elapsed, marital status, wave and region dummies. Sample sizes are 6,079 for Panel A regressions and 30,496 for Panel B 
regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. vble: Any health problem Dep. vble: Number of health problems
Table 3. Importance of Health, Insurance, and Health Care Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Current 
wave hosp
Current 
wave hosp
Next wave 
hosp
Next wave 
hosp
Current 
wave visit
Current 
wave visit
Next 
wave visit
Next 
wave visit
PHI provided by employer (N‐group) ‐0.067 ‐0.078*
[0.042] [0.040]
0.029 0.038 ‐0.005 ‐0.004 0.005 0.016 0.006 0.007
[0.027] [0.025] [0.019] [0.019] [0.039] [0.040] [0.043] [0.044]
No. of observations 948 948 767 891 786 823 948 948 875 875
Current 
wave hosp
Current 
wave hosp
Next wave 
hosp
Next wave 
hosp
Current 
wave visit
Current 
wave visit
Next 
wave visit
Next 
wave visit
PHI provided by employer (N‐group) ‐0.063* ‐0.067*
[0.037] [0.037]
PHI deducted from wages ‐0.023 ‐0.013
[0.049] [0.047]
PHI obtained through relative ‐0.092 ‐0.089
[0.056] [0.056]
Without PHI (DN‐group) ‐0.093*** ‐0.097***
[0.031] [0.032]
0.019** 0.020** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.012 0.012 0.035* 0.034
[0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021]
No. of observations 4,534 4,534 4,537 4,537 4,141 4,141 4,537 4,537 4,141 4,141
Controls (both panels)
Industry and occupation Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
Plant size and pension offer Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
Earnings Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Smoker Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Education Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Panel A) Sample: male employees aged 23‐59 that have PHI either provided by employer or bought directly                       
(Panel B) Sample: male employees aged 23‐59 irrespective of PHI                                                    
Dependent var: Any hospitalisation
Dependent var: Any hospitalisation
Dep. var:  Health is very 
important for the 
respondent
Dep. var:  Health is very 
important for the 
respondent
Notes: Each column shows marginal effects computed from two Probit regressions with two different samples (as specified in the header of Panel A and Panel B) but with the same 
set of control variables (as specified in the bottom of the table). Columns 1 and 2 show  marginal effects with respect to the default category: directly bought PHI. Control variables 
included in all regressions are: age, time elapsed, marital status, wave and region dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent var: Any visit to the GP
Dependent var: Any visit to the GP
Health is very important for respondent
Health is very important for respondent
Table 4. Testing the Representativiness of the Comparison Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.003 0.003 ‐0.024 ‐0.032 ‐0.029 ‐0.032 ‐0.015 ‐0.026
[0.008] [0.008] [0.021] [0.021] [0.028] [0.028] [0.055] [0.054]
PHI provided by employer ‐0.00004 ‐0.002 0.024 0.01 0.025 0.001 0.056 0.01
[0.006] [0.005] [0.017] [0.016] [0.022] [0.022] [0.044] [0.042]
Controls (both panels)
Industry and occupation Y N Y N Y N Y N
Plant size and pension offer Y N Y N Y N Y N
Earnings Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Smoker Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Education Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dep. vble: Any visit to 
the GP
Dep. Vble: Any health 
problem
Dep. Vble: Number 
health problems
Notes: Each column shows marginal effects from two regressions with two different samples (as specified in the header of Panel A and Panel B) but 
with the same set of control variables (as specified in the bottom of the table). Probit models were used in columns 1‐6 and OLS in columns 7 and 8. 
Control variables included in all regressions are: age, time elapsed, marital status, wave and region dummies. Sample excludes individuals that have 
their PHI premium deducted from their wage, as well as individuals that obtain PHI through a relative. Sample size is 22466 for Panel A regressions, and 
25011 for Panel B regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(Panel A) Sample: male employees aged 23‐59 who belong to either the D‐group, or the N‐group 
before they get  employer‐provided PHI 
Dep. vble: Hospitalisation
Dep. vble: Any visit to 
the GP
Dep. Vble: Any health 
problem
Dep. vble: Number 
health problems
Will have employer‐provided PHI 
in the future
(Panel B) Sample: male employees aged 23‐59 who belong to either the D‐group, or the N‐group 
after they get  employer‐provided PHI 
Dep. vble: Hospitalisation
Table 5. Models of Having Employer‐Provided PHI 
(1) (2) (3)
Age (years) 0 ‐0.001 0
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Married or cohabitating ‐0.011 ‐0.008 0.032**
[0.012] [0.014] [0.014]
Less than O‐levels ‐0.027 ‐0.027 0.003
[0.029] [0.031] [0.024]
O‐levels 0.005 0.02 0.051**
[0.025] [0.027] [0.021]
A‐levels 0.012 0.04 0.098***
[0.026] [0.029] [0.024]
College 0.028 0.045* 0.138***
[0.023] [0.025] [0.018]
More than college 0.018 0.004 0.160***
[0.033] [0.034] [0.036]
Smoker ‐0.040*** ‐0.045***
[0.012] [0.013]
LN of monthly earnings (2008 £) 0.151*** 0.234***
[0.013] [0.014]
P‐Values of other controls
Industry 0.000 na na
Occupation 0.000 na na
Pension offer 0.000 na na
Plant size 0.001 na na
Pseudo‐R squared 0.28 0.15 0.05
Notes: Marginal effects estimated through Probit models are shown. Sample 
includes male employees aged 23‐59 that either have PHI provided by 
employer, bought it directly or do not have PHI (sample excludes individuals 
with PHI deducted through wages and individuals that obtain PHI through a 
relative). Cells are empty or labelled `na' if the variable was not included in the 
regression.  Other controls always included are wave and region dummies. 
Sample size is 28,581. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6. Hospitalisation Funding Source (conditional on hospitalisation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NHS funded 
hosp
NHS partially 
funded hosp
NHS funded 
hosp
NHS partially 
funded hosp
PHI provided by employer (N‐group) ‐0.103 ‐0.051 ‐0.089 ‐0.033
[0.085] [0.083] [0.088] [0.090]
PHI deducted from wages 0.141 0.135
[0.098] [0.097]
PHI obtained through relative 0.075 0.045
[0.099] [0.098]
Without PHI (DN‐group) 0.341*** 0.312***
[0.075] [0.075]
Sample size 1,489 1,489 297 297
Notes: Marginal effects (estimated using Probit regressions) are shown with respect to the default category: 
directly bought PHI. Sample in columns 1 and 2 includes male employees aged 23‐59. Sample in columns 3 and 4 is 
the same as in columns 1 and 2 but excludes individuals with PHI deducted from wages, individuals that obtained 
PHI through a relative, and individuals without PHI. Control variables include: age, marital status, education, 
smoker, and LN(earnings). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Fig. 1. The equilibrium under symmetric information 
 
Notes. The equilibrium pair of contracts in the absence of a public option is (𝛼𝐿∗, 𝛼𝐻∗ ), where, for each 
type, profits are zero and the isoprofit line is tangent to the indifference curve. Point H0 (L0) is the final 
wealth vector associated to the public option such that the high risk (low risk) is indifferent between 
sectors. The equilibrium set of active contracts depends on the position of the public option in the vertical 
line trough w.  
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Fig. 2. The equilibrium under asymmetric information 
 
Notes. The equilibrium pair of contracts in the absence of a public option is (𝛼𝐻∗ ,𝛼�𝐿), where the high risk 
receives the same contract as under symmetric information, whereas the low risk receives a contract such 
that profits are zero and the high risk is indifferent between the two contracts. Point H0 is the same as 
under symmetric information. Point L1 is the final wealth vector associated to the public option such that 
the low risk is indifferent between sectors. The equilibrium set of active contracts depends on the position 
of the public option in the vertical line trough w. 
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Fig. 3. Heterogeneous risk aversion 
 
Notes. The equilibrium pair of contracts in the absence of a public option is (𝛼𝐿∗, 𝛼𝐻∗ ), where subindices 
indicate risk, not risk aversion and coincide with the equilibrium pair in Figure 1.  Thicker indifference 
curves represent individuals with higher risk aversion. For J = L, H and K = L, H, point JK0 is the final 
wealth vector associated to the public option such that type JK (risk is J and risk aversion is K) is 
indifferent between sectors. The roman numerals label regions used in the proofs. 
 
 
 
 
  
w 
a 
A 
n 
UHH 
Possible 
positions of 
the public 
package P 
45º 
*
Hα  
*
Lα  
LH0 
HH0 
LL0 
HL0 
UHL 
ULH 
ULL 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Heterogeneous losses 
 
Notes. Here we consider only types HH (high risk and high loss) and LL (low risk and low loss). This 
implies that the high-loss no-insurance point is below the low-loss one. Losses are depicted by the two 
dashed vertical arrows ℓ𝐿 and ℓ𝐻. The equilibrium pair of contracts in the absence of a public option is 
(𝛼𝐿𝐿∗ , 𝛼𝐻𝐻∗ ). Both yield zero profits and are efficient. We assume that all types receive the same coverage 
cPUB in the public option. We depict a specific public coverage in the figure by means of point PH for type 
HH and point PL for type LL, which represent the respective final wealth vector. For this specific public 
coverage, the high risk prefers PHI whereas the low risk prefers the public option, hence selection is 
adverse. 
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Fig. 5. Complementary private insurance 
 
Notes. If PHI is complementary to the public one, isoprofits cease to stem from point A, where the 
individual has neither public nor private insurance. Isoprofits instead stem from point B, where the 
individual enjoys the public coverage.  The equilibrium PHI contracts are derived and denoted as in 
Figures 1 (when information is symmetric) and 2 (when information is asymmetric). All individuals 
purchase PHI under every informational scenario. 
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